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abstraCt: although the online business-to-consumer (B2C) channel is the primary 
selling channel for digital content (e.g., videos, images, and music), modern digi-
tal technology has made possible the legal dissemination of such content over the 
consumer-to-consumer (C2C) channel through personal computing devices, such as 
PCs, mobile phones, and portable media players. This paper investigates the optimal 
channel structure and the corresponding pricing and service strategies for digital 
content distribution in order to understand the business value of introducing the C2C 
channel alongside the prevailing B2C channel. We identify conditions under which 
it is more profitable to use both B2C and C2C channels simultaneously (i.e., the 
dual-channel distribution). In such cases, the seller performs price discrimination 
among consumers but provides them with a higher level of service. Our analysis 
further characterizes the benefits of service provision. We show that service provi-
sion can increase the dual-channel pricing flexibility, reduce the seller’s B2C channel 
dependence, and allow the seller to tolerate higher C2C channel redistribution costs. 
finally, in examining the effect of a competitively determined B2C channel price on 
optimal channel strategy, we find that the seller prefers a dual-channel distribution 
under higher B2C channel prices.
∗
 all authors contributed equally to this paper.
Published in  Journal of Management Information Systems
2009, Volume 25,  Issue 4 , Pages 241-270
https://doi.org/10.2753/MIS0742-1222250408
242     fENg, guO, aND ChIaNg
KeY Words and phrases: B2C, C2C, channel strategy, digital content, dual channel, 
pricing, service.
in a reCent intervieW, Douglas Merrill, former google chief information officer (CIO) 
and now president of EMI digital business division, said, “I think the industry as a 
whole has got some really interesting experiments in what the future world is. . . . 
We don’t know yet what the real business model is going to be. We have to do more 
experiments, try more things to see what works” [17]. at a time when the music 
industry is in flux, Merrill’s move from google to EMI aims to help the company 
form a digital business strategy to compete on the Internet. It is yet to be seen what 
innovation is needed in a realm where all music companies have had limited success. 
It is clear, however, that integration of technology innovation into the firm’s digital 
business strategy is being taken seriously.
The Web has created unprecedented opportunities to distribute digital content 
(or information goods) such as music, videos, e-books, and software. anyone who 
owns the product can become an effective marketer in the distribution chain due to 
easy reproduction and redistribution. On the other hand, this capability can easily be 
outweighed by increasing online infringement. In contrast to conventional methods 
such as tight law enforcement, and technology protection that increases the costs to 
pirates, of copyright violation, an alternative solution invites consumers to a broader 
participation in the distribution chain so they can be hosts for legitimate business 
as easily as for copyright infringement [10]. This new approach rewards consumers 
who share the digital content with others. Because unlimited copies of the digital 
content can be created and distributed, the reward could be large enough to cover the 
original purchase price. The reward provides an economic incentive for consumers to 
purchase and distribute digital files legitimately. as new technological tools can meet 
both business and consumer needs that were impossible before, allowing consumers’ 
active participation in the distribution chain is now recognized as an innovative digital 
business strategy for distributing information goods [24].
Several business initiatives with regard to the digital content distribution have 
been proposed in various technological environments. for instance, Brilliant Digital 
Entertainment subsidiary altnet formed an alliance with KaZaa to kick off a peer-to-
peer (P2P) marketing campaign [10]. KaZaa users who search for content see results 
displaying altnet files with a gold icon, indicating that the files are available for law-
ful download and use. users who share the searched files with others can accumulate 
gold Points to redeem rewards. More recently, a novel platform was proposed in the 
mobile commerce environment for the free trade of digital content where ordinary 
users are allowed to market and resell copies of digital content to neighbors in their 
wireless devices vicinity [5, 12]. Transactions among users can first be performed in 
an offline P2P manner without the immediate assistance of any central entity. later 
when users are connected to the Internet, sales are recorded and parties involved in 
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the transactions are credited to their own accounts accordingly. resellers share part 
of the proceeds with the original copyright owner as both incentive rewards for their 
marketing efforts and compensations for their contribution of personal resources for the 
offline transaction. Such a process has been shown to be technically feasible [15].
The underlying technology that makes the decentralized distribution architecture 
work is digital rights management (DrM) [9]. DrM is an umbrella term including 
any digital protection system on any type of digital media. Common types of DrM 
include encrypted codes on DVDs and CDs, digital watermarking, and product activa-
tion. DrM aims at protecting ownership and copyright of digital content by restricting 
what actions an authorized recipient may take with respect to that content. for example, 
apple’s iPod uses its own DrM system called “fairPlay,” which encrypts songs and 
limits the playback of music purchased on iTunes, thereby protecting musicians’ 
copyrights [3]. While music labels continue their battle against illegal downloading 
in the courts, they have increasingly shifted their focus toward promoting legitimate 
online distribution. Embracing and leveraging DrM technology is essential to this 
effort. So far, a healthy number of DrM-codec platforms have been approved for use 
by mobile operators to explore this mobile music market opportunity [31].
Two other factors also contribute to the development of this new form of paid-content, 
consumer-to-consumer (C2C) channel distribution. first, increasingly popular social 
interactions among taste-sharing user groups can easily transform fans into effec-
tive marketers in the Internet environment. This model exploits social interactions 
to promote digital product distribution and consumption. Second, newly available 
information technologies (IT) such as micropayments provide trading platforms to 
support distributed information processing and market transactions among consum-
ers. This secured trading environment makes it technically feasible for the copyright 
owner to effectively track sales and monitor user accounts. Both social networks and 
new trading platforms help create the most cost-effective model for legitimate C2C 
distribution.
Yet although the concept is intuitively appealing and technically feasible, its under-
lying business model is neither well defined nor widely adopted. Today, the dominant 
trading platform for digital products is based on the online business-to-consumer 
(B2C) model. There are over 500 legitimate online music services in over 40 coun-
tries. iTunes, the leader in online downloads, has sold over 2 billion tracks since its 
launch in april 2003 and more than 1 billion in 2006 alone [9]. The recent innovation 
of the incentive-based C2C channel distribution represents a new business strategy 
addressing the emerging new form of digital content delivery. along with the huge 
potential, growing pains can occur when established business models are confronted 
with emerging technological advances. Businesses must carefully assess the potential 
benefits and involved trade-offs when integrating the new C2C channel distribution 
into their existing B2C channel strategy. This paper aims to address these fundamental 
issues in the dual-channel design and distribution.
We have developed economic models to study the business potential of adopting a 
dual-channel distribution for a digital product with heterogeneous consumers whose 
willingness to pay depends on both their inherent valuation of the product and the 
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associated service provision provided by the product seller/creator. under various 
market scenarios, we identify conditions under which it is more profitable to use both 
B2C and C2C channels simultaneously. We find that when the dual-channel distribution 
is optimal, the seller will always set a higher B2C channel price and offer a higher 
level of service in comparison to the optimal single-channel distribution strategy. Our 
further analysis also indicates that service provision increases the dual-channel pricing 
flexibility, reduces the seller’s B2C channel dependence, and allows the seller to toler-
ate a higher C2C channel redistribution cost. We also explore a likely scenario where 
the digital product has a competitively determined price in the B2C channel. We find 
that the higher the B2C channel price, the less the seller’s B2C channel dependence 
in adopting an optimal dual-channel strategy.
literature review
tWo streams of literature are partiCularlY relevant to our study—dual-channel 
strategies in the supply chain and economics models for digital content distribution.
a large body of work on the supply-chain structures over the Internet has focused 
on the dual-channel distribution models, which typically consist of a manufacturer-
owned direct sales channel and an intermediated retail channel. Channel conflict and 
coordination have been widely studied in the literature, often with a focus on pricing 
[29]. under various scenarios, dual-channel design has been shown to have important 
strategic implications in firms’ optimal distribution strategy [18].
Besides pricing, service has been viewed as a nonprice attribute that positively affects 
demand [14, 28, 30]. Strategic consumers who either have heterogeneous valuation [8] 
or heterogeneous preference toward channel selection [4] have also been considered 
in modeling channel competition. however, most works in this area assume the dual-
channel distribution structure of selling physical products in a B2C environment. few 
insights are available for managing the sales of digital products in an environment that 
can be characterized by extensive C2C interaction.
With the increasingly sophisticated Internet delivery channel and the ever-increasing 
digitalization of products and services, economics of digital goods have received sub-
stantial research attention in recent years [19, 23, 25]. Due to the popularity of P2P 
technologies and free content shared and exchanged in the network, piracy is often 
considered as a significant threat on the copyright owners’ profitability [6, 16]. Some 
studies assume that pirate copies are low-quality alternatives to original products. It is 
shown that, under some conditions, unauthorized reproduction can help the copyright 
owner price discriminate different classes of consumers [26]. alternatively, piracy can 
be viewed as an opportunity for consumers to try out the product before making a 
legitimate purchase. Therefore, sampling can be a potential piracy-mitigating strategy 
[7]. Much research effort in this area shows the potential of using economic rather 
than purely technical solutions to fight piracy.
In addition to piracy, free riding [27] is another widely observed phenomenon. Vari-
ous incentive mechanisms and payment schemes have been proposed to encourage 
users to share files in P2P networks [11]. One way to ensure participants are com-
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pensated is cascading payments, where royalties and commissions are determined by 
the flow of distribution through the system [1]. another solution, dynamic referral 
strategy, provides payment to users who distribute content to others depending on the 
sufficient diffusion of digital media in the P2P network [13]. however, none of these 
proposed methods have yet been successfully implemented.
recent work also shows that in the competitive interaction between the centralized 
client-server structure and the decentralized P2P networks, the coexistence of a P2P 
network with a competing centralized architecture can be mutually beneficial [2]. The 
same study suggests that the impact of P2P networks needs to be carefully considered 
when pricing digital legal downloads in the B2C market. Prior work, while interesting, 
does not consider an integrated model that can be supported by a platform structure 
taking advantage of both the centralized (e.g., iTunes) and decentralized (e.g., C2C) 
distribution strategies. This paper aims to provide a first step toward understanding 
the consumer-oriented dual-channel distribution of digital content.
a Dual-Channel Model with C2C Distribution
in this seCtion, We present tWo general models. The benchmark model has a digital 
product seller (or copyright owner) operating an online B2C channel that sells directly 
to customers. We compare this single-channel model with a dual-channel model in 
which the seller allows consumers who have already purchased the product from the 
online B2C channel to legally resell to other consumers (i.e., using both the B2C direct 
channel and the C2C indirect channel simultaneously).
first, let us focus on the single-channel model. Consider a seller who sells a digital 
product to a market with heterogeneous consumers through the online B2C direct 
channel. We characterize each consumer by a parameter, n ∈  [0, a], representing 
his or her basic valuation for the digital product. following a conventional treatment 
(e.g., [21, 22, 27]), we assume that the basic valuation is uniformly distributed with 
the population density normalized to one, which, without further loss of generality, 
captures heterogeneity in necessities, preferences, tastes, and purchasing power, and so 
on, for the digital product. We further assume that a consumer’s willingness to pay also 
depends on a product-specific service, denoted by s, that is provided by the seller. The 
service can be understood as a nonprice attribute associated with the product offering, 
such as product quality, after sales supports, software updates, warranties, and so on. 
The service can also be viewed as terms and conditions that are defined by the access 
control technologies in terms of usage, transfer, or storage of the digital product. for 
example, enhancing the quality of graphical user interface (guI) or incorporating 
additional features of a given computer software can typically increase consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the product. Similarly, a song with unlimited playbacks is more 
valuable than the same song with a limited number of playbacks, and a video file 
that can be played in most commonly used digital media devices is more attractive 
than the same video file that can only be played on some restricted codec platforms. 
Therefore, we define the reservation price for the consumer whose basic valuation is 
n as U(n, s) = n + fs, where f is a positive constant that measures the service effect.
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let p denote the price charged by the seller. assume that each consumer, who de-
mands at most one unit, will buy the product if the resulting surplus is nonnegative. 
Then, the valuation of the consumer who is indifferent about buying from the B2C 
channel is defined as n[:
 n[ = p – fs. (1)
Because all customers whose valuation satisfies n ∈ [n[, a] will buy the product, the 
total number of buyers will be a – n[, that is,
 D(p, s) = a – p + fs. (2)
Obviously, the market demand is affected negatively by market price p, but positively 
by the seller’s service effort s.
alternatively, the seller can consider a dual-channel model consisting of both a 
B2C direct channel and a C2C indirect channel. Suppose the original seller charges 
a royalty fee, denoted by R, to the reseller for successfully redistributing the digital 
product to a customer through the C2C channel. let d be the cost incurred by the 
resellers to redistribute the product to a customer.1 The redistribution cost d reflects 
the sellers’ time and the effort spent in the redistribution processes, which include 
identifying potential customers, interacting with them, differentiating among them, 
and redistributing the product to them through the C2C technology.
To account for the rich interactive patterns and unique C2C distribution nature in 
the C2C network, assume that the C2C channel pricing decision is delegated to the 
consumer resellers, who may charge a high/low price to high-/low-valuation consum-
ers.2 Therefore, unlike that in the B2C channel, the price in the C2C channel is not 
a decision variable for the original seller. The C2C channel prices will be negotiated 
between the resellers and the buyers such that the resellers have a nonnegative sur-
plus for making a sale and the buyers have a higher surplus to buy from the resellers 
(rather than to buy from the B2C channel with price p). Thus, given the B2C price p, 
the royalty fee R, and the redistribution cost d, all possible prices in the C2C channel 
fall on the interval [R + d, p]. This implies that no sales will occur in the C2C chan-
nel if R + d > p. When R + d ≤ p, the marginal consumer who is offered the lowest 
possible price R + d is indifferent to buying from the C2C channel or nothing at all. 
The marginal consumer’s valuation n] is expressed as
 n] = R + d – fs. (3)
When there is an opportunity to buy the product in the C2C channel, there is a 
channel cannibalization effect on the B2C channel. To model this effect, we define q, 
0 < q ≤ 1, as the proportion of innovators (or loyal consumers) who always buy from 
the B2C channel and become the early adopters of the product provided that the price 
p does not exceed their reservation prices. If the innovators cannot afford to buy from 
the B2C channel (p is higher than their reservation prices), they would buy from the 
C2C channel so long as the offered price in the C2C channel is lower than or equal 
to their reservation prices. accordingly, those innovators whose valuation satisfies 
n ∈ [n[, a] (Segment 1 in figure 1) will buy from the online B2C channel, while those 
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with n ∈ [n], n[] (Segment 2 in figure 1) will buy from the C2C channel at an affordable 
price. all other customers whose valuation satisfies n ∈ [n], a] (Segment 3 in figure 1) 
will buy from the C2C channel with a higher consumer surplus.
as a result, the total number of customers in Segments 1, 2, and 3, respectively, can 
be spelled out as q(a – p + fs), q(p – R – d), and (1 – q)(a – R – d + fs). In summary, 
the total demand in the B2C channel (Segment 1) is given by
 DB(p, s) = q(a – p + fs), (4)
while the total demand in the C2C channel (Segments 2 and 3) is specified as
 DC(p, R, s) = (1 – q)(a – p + fs) + p – R – d. (5)
It is straightforward to verify that Equation (5) reflects the empirically most likely 
scenario where the demand in the C2C channel increases in the B2C channel price 
p and the service level s, but decreases in the royalty fee R. Note that the parameter 
a can be interpreted as the potential market size. When price and service are offered 
such that all consumers make their purchase, we say the market has full coverage. 
Otherwise, the market has partial coverage.
To capture the diminishing returns on service expenditure, following a common 
assumption in the literature (e.g., [14, 28]), let the service cost incurred by the seller 
be a quadratic function of the service effort, s2/2. When only the B2C channel strategy 
is adopted, the seller sets the price and the service level that maximize its total profit 
given by
 
Π1
2
2
p s p a p fs s, .( ) = − +( ) −
 
(6)
On the other hand, when the dual-channel strategy is adopted, the seller maximizes 
the following profit by determining the B2C channel price, the service level, and the 
royalty fee:
 
Π2
2
1
2
p s R p a p fs R a p fs p R d, , .( ) = − +( ) + −( ) − +( ) + − −( ) −θ θ s
 
(7)
Table 1 summarizes the optimal decisions and the corresponding optimal channel 
profits with different channel strategies under different market conditions.3
Figure 1. Market Segmentation
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When the single-channel strategy is adopted, it is more profitable for the seller to 
provide full market coverage if f > 1. When the dual-channel strategy is adopted, the 
profit-maximizing seller will provide full market coverage if
 
f a d
a
>
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
.
accordingly, depending on the parametric values observed, there are four market 
scenarios as illustrated in figure 2:
SD-Partial: Partial coverage with both single- and dual-channel strategies;
D-full:  Partial coverage with single-channel strategy and full coverage with 
dual-channel strategy;
S-full:  Partial coverage with dual-channel strategy and full coverage with 
single-channel strategy;
SD-full:  full coverage with both single- and dual-channel strategies.
Optimal Channel Strategy
bY direCt Comparison of the dual-Channel and single-channel profits in Table 1, we 
can identify the optimal channel structure and the corresponding pricing and service 
strategies under the different market scenarios.
Proposition 1: (a) In an SD‑Partial market, it is optimal for the seller to adopt the 
dual‑channel strategy when the proportion of innovators q > q1, where
 
θ1
2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
=
−( ) −( )
−( ) + −( )
d f a d
a df d a df
.
 
(8)
(b) In a D‑Full market, it is optimal for the seller to adopt the dual‑channel 
strategy when the proportion of innovators q > q2, where
 
θ2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2
=
−( ) −( ) +( )
+( ) −( )
a f d af a
a d f
.
 
(9)
(c) In an S‑Full market, it is always optimal to adopt the single‑channel 
strategy.
(d) In an SD‑Full market, it is optimal for the seller to adopt the dual‑channel 
strategy when the proportion of innovators q > q3, where
 
θ3 2
4
=
+( )
ad
a d
.
 
(10)
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Proofs for the propositions are in the appendix. figure 3 shows a graphical represen-
tation of this proposition.
Obviously, the proportion of innovators q must be high enough to validate the 
dual-channel distribution. further sensitivity analysis for q with respect to other pa-
rameters shows that when f 2 ≤ 1, the threshold levels q1 and q2 decrease in the market 
size a and the responsiveness of market demand to service f 2, but increase in the C2C 
channel redistribution cost d. In a different way, the threshold level q3 is independent 
of service-related market parameters when f 2 > 1. This is evident from Table 1 that 
the seller charges the same level of services s1 = s2 = af regardless of selling through 
single channel or dual channel.
In order to further understand the effect of channel structure on pricing and service 
strategies, we compare the optimal prices and services in the single channel with those 
in the dual channel. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: (a) Under the optimal dual‑channel strategy, the seller sets a 
higher price in the B2C channel and a lower royalty fee in the C2C channel than 
the price in the single channel, that is, p2s > p1s > Rs.
(b) Under the optimal dual‑channel strategy, the seller always sets a higher service 
level than that in the single channel, that is, s2 > s1.
an intuitive explanation for the above results holds that in the dual-channel distri-
bution, a profit-maximizing seller sets prices and service more efficiently to achieve 
Figure 2. Optimal Market Coverage with Different Channel Strategy
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the second-degree price discrimination. The coordination between the B2C and C2C 
channels allows the seller to charge a higher price and offer a higher service in the 
dual-channel B2C market than their single-channel counterparts.
Effect of redistribution Cost on Optimal Channel Strategy
We have identified the threshold values for adopting the dual-channel strategy 
under different market scenarios in Proposition 1. figure 4 illustrates the effect of 
the C2C channel redistribution cost d on the three threshold values expressed in 
Equations (8)–(10).
It indicates a positive correlation between the least redistribution cost d in the C2C 
channel and the least portion of innovators for adopting the dual-channel strategy. 
The intuition is that, when the redistribution cost is relatively low, the seller can rely 
on resellers to generate more profit in the C2C market to compensate for his or her 
loss in the B2C market. Therefore, the seller can afford a low portion of innovators 
to purchase through the B2C channel. In contrast, when the redistribution cost is 
relatively high, the seller is more interested in securing sales in the B2C channel, 
thus requiring a higher portion of innovative consumers. Moreover, the indifference 
threshold is more sensitive to the redistribution cost in an SD-Partial market than in 
other markets. This implies that reducing the consumer redistribution cost can more 
easily promote adoption of the dual-channel distribution in a partially covered market 
under both the optimal single- and dual-channel strategies.
Figure 3. Optimal Channel Choices
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Impact of Proportion of Innovators on  
Channel Profitability
Now we investigate the impact of the proportion of innovators on the relative benefit 
of the dual-channel strategy in comparison with the single-channel counterpart un-
der different market scenarios. using the corresponding single-channel profit as the 
benchmark, figure 5 illustrates the percentage gain or loss in profit when adopting 
the dual-channel distribution with respect to the change of the proportion of innova-
tors q for a given set of parametric values (a = 6, d = 0.4, f = 0.1 (SD-Partial), 0.9 
(D-full), and 1.3 (SD-full)).
The strictly increasing curves in the figure show that, although the dual-channel 
strategy yields more profit than the single-channel strategy as the proportion of 
innovators increases under all three market scenarios, the slope of the increase is 
slightly different. When the responsiveness of service relative to price (i.e., parameter 
f ) is high, the profit increase is less significant than other cases. The primary reason, 
as we believe, is that both dual-channel and single-channel operations result in an 
SD-full market in which the maximum market demand is achieved and there is no 
room for further improvement in profitability. The managerial insight, however, is 
that dual-channel design still brings additional benefit in a fully covered market by 
price differentiation and finer market segmentation. In contrast, the most significant 
benefit can be achieved when the responsiveness of service relative to price is me-
dium. In other words, when neither price nor service effect dominates each other, it 
is more beneficial to adopt the dual-channel rather than the single-channel distribu-
tion strategy.
Figure 4. The Effect of d on the Threshold Values for the Dual-Channel Strategy
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additional results and Insights
from previous analYsis, We see that both service provision and pricing decisions col-
lectively contribute to flexible channel design and profit optimization. In this section, 
we provide more insights into optimal channel strategy to clarify their respective 
effects under different market conditions.
absence of Service Provision Effect
It is increasingly evident that IT contributes to service innovation and should be tightly 
integrated in the digital product distribution. for example, a digital product should 
be sold together with a service agreement, which may govern the usage, transfer, or 
storage of the product. The ability to offer product-specific services can influence 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the product, thus potentially affecting the seller’s 
pricing strategies. In this section, we quantify the benefits of service provision in both 
the dual-channel and the single-channel distribution.
Optimal Channel Strategy Without Service
Simply setting s1 = 0, we have the optimal prices 
 
p
a d
2
3
4
=
−( ) −
−
θ
θ
Figure 5. Impact of Proportion of Innovators on Channel Profitability
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for the dual channel. The single-channel price and profit are p1 = a/2 and P1(p1) = 
a2/4, respectively.
Proposition 3: In the absence of service provision, the optimal channel strategy 
is to choose dual channel when the proportion of innovators q > q4, where
 
θ4
4 2
4
=
−( )
+( )
d a d
a a d
.
 (11)
Comparative statics shows that the threshold level q4 decreases in the maximum 
valuation a, and increases in the redistribution cost d. further comparing Equation (11) 
with (10) we see that in a market that can be fully covered with both the single-channel 
and dual-channel strategies under service provision, the same qualitative insights for 
choosing the optimal dual-channel strategy hold in the absence of service provision.
Proposition 4: Under the optimal dual‑channel strategy without service provision, 
the seller sets a higher price in the B2C channel but a lower royalty fee in the 
C2C channel than the price in the single channel, that is, p2 > p1 > R.
Comparing Propositions 2 and 4, we see that pricing strategies in the dual channel 
without service have similar qualitative insights as those in the dual channel with 
service provision.
Dual Channel With and Without Service
To better understand the effects of key parameters on pricing strategies, market de-
mand, and channel profit in the dual-channel design, we perform comparative statics 
on the proportion of innovators q in the B2C channel and the C2C channel redistribu-
tion cost d. Signs of the first derivatives are shown in Table 2.
Not surprisingly, the qualitative effects on q or d are the same regardless of service 
provision, except the impact of q on the B2C channel price. an increase of q will 
lead to a decrease of the B2C channel price in the dual channel without service, 
indicating the seller’s willingness to offer lower price to attract demand from the 
innovators in the B2C channel. however, an increase of q does not necessarily lead 
to a decrease of the B2C channel price in the dual channel with service provision, 
implying that service does reduce the seller’s dependence on the B2C channel sales 
to generate profit.
Evidently, the C2C channel redistribution cost d has a positive effect on the B2C 
channel demand but a negative effect on the C2C channel demand. Because the total 
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channel profit decreases as d increases, there is a threshold value beyond which the 
single-channel outperforms the dual-channel distribution. The following proposi-
tion compares the maximum affordable redistribution costs that make dual-channel 
distribution feasible in the presence or absence of service provision:
Proposition 5: The threshold redistribution cost in the dual channel with service 
is higher than that in the dual channel without service, that is, d
_
 < d
_
s
.
This implies that service provision in the dual-channel distribution can more ef-
fectively tolerate consumers’ relatively higher redistribution cost. Consequently, the 
seller can make more profit from the service-enhanced B2C channel sales and becomes 
less dependent on the C2C channel distribution for revenue generation. The following 
result shows another benefit of service provision on the seller’s pricing strategy:
Proposition 6: Under optimal pricing, the dual channel with service strategy 
has higher pricing flexibility than that in the dual channel without service, that 
is, p2 – R < p2
s
 – Rs.
recall that the C2C prices falls on the interval [R + d, p]. Simply deducting d 
on both sides of the above inequality we can easily compare the C2C price ranges. 
Therefore, given the consumer redistribution cost d, the C2C price range in the dual 
channel with service provision is larger than that in the dual-channel without service 
provision. This demonstrates the value of service provision in improving the dual-
channel pricing flexibility.
Dual Channel Without Service Versus Single Channel With Service
from Table 1, we know that under optimal pricing, the seller always prefers to provide 
a positive level of service. from a different perspective, the following proposition 
compares the relative effectiveness between choosing dual-channel distribution without 
service and single channel with service:
Table 2. Comparative Statics in the Dual-Channel Distribution
 Sign of derivative  Sign of derivative
 with respect to q with respect to d
 With  Without With Without
 service service service service
B2C price  +/– – – –
C2C royalty fee  – – – –
Service  + N/A – N/A
B2C channel demand  + + + +
C2C channel demand  – – – –
Total channel profit  + + – –
Note: N/a = not applicable.
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Proposition 7: If 
 
f a d
a ad d
<
−( )
− +( )
2
2
2
2 2
,
the seller prefers dual‑channel distribution without service to single‑channel 
distribution with service if the proportion of innovators q > q5, where
 
θ5
2 2
2
2 2 2
4 2
=
−( ) + −( )( )
+ −( )
d a d a d f
a a d df
.
 (12)
The conditions state that, when the proportion of innovators is high and demand 
responsiveness to service is not big enough, the seller would prefer a dual channel 
without service provision to a single channel with service provision.
In further comparison of the different threshold values in Equations (8)–(12) we 
find the following relation:
Proposition 8: Service provision can decrease the channel indifference threshold, 
that is, q3 <q2 < q1 < q4 < q5.
Since the seller will prefer the dual-channel distribution only if the proportion of 
innovators is higher than the threshold value, the result q3 < q2 < q1 < q4 shows that 
service provision can reduce the seller’s dependence on the innovative consumers to 
find the dual-channel distribution more profitable. Moreover, the relationship q4 < q5 
indicates another aspect of the service benefit, as it requires a higher threshold value 
to justify the dual channel without service provision strategy in comparison to the 
single channel with a service provision.
absence of Monopolistic Pricing Power
In a competitive market environment, it is increasingly difficult for firms to exercise 
market power. a firm that is unable to exercise market power is known as a price 
taker. for example, we observe that the price in the online music market is relatively 
stable across digital music providers.4 Since apple priced music at a flat fee $0.99 
per track in 2003, it has formed a consumer expectation that everyone else has to fol-
low. Therefore, a price-taking firm can employ a competitive pricing strategy which 
simply sets its prices on the basis of the prices charged by competitors or the price 
established by an industry leader. Price-taking firms must rely on other differentiating 
factors such as services to attract customers.
To understand the effect of competitively determined B2C channel price on price-
taking firms’ service provision and channel strategy, now we extend the general model 
to a special scenario in which the B2C channel price p is assumed competitively 
determined by the industry or market. The only decision variable for the seller is the 
service level s in the single-channel model, while the service level s and the royalty 
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fee R are the decision variables in the dual-channel model. Table 3 summarizes the 
optimal price and service strategies and the optimal-channel profits.
Comparing optimal profits under the single-channel and dual-channel distribution, 
we have the following results:
Proposition 9: When the B2C channel price is competitively determined, the 
optimal channel strategy is to choose dual channel when q > q], where
 
�θ = +( )B A∆ /
and
 
A a p a p pf f p d pf= −( ) − +( ) + +( )2 22 2 2
 
B a p pf a pf d p a p p df= − +( ) +( ) + −( ) + +( )3 22 2 2
 
∆ = −( ) + +( ) − − +( )4 2 2 2 5 22 2 2 2 2 2dp a p f dp p a d p d p f .
figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the threshold value q] and B2C channel 
price p with a given set of parametric values (a = 30, f = 0.2, d = 1).
We see that the threshold value for adopting an optimal dual-channel strategy 
decreases in the B2C channel price. When p is high enough, the dual-channel strat-
egy outperforms the single-channel strategy regardless of the portion of innovators. 
however, when p is relatively low, it requires a relatively large portion of innovators 
in order for the dual-channel distribution to be optimal. When p ≤ d, the dual-channel 
strategy is infeasible regardless of the portion of innovators.
Concluding remarks
With the proliferation of e-CommerCe, firms have become increasingly creative in 
their use of multiple selling channels to distribute digital products. In addition to the 
popular B2C channel distribution, there are now emerging opportunities to involve 
consumers in C2C channel transactions. This study has investigated the business value 
of this emerging dual-channel strategy in facilitating digital content distribution.
Specifically, we have constructed economic models to analyze a digital product 
seller’s optimal channel structure and pricing and service strategies. under various 
market conditions, we found that dual-channel distribution is more favorable than 
single-channel distribution when the portion of innovators in the consumer popula-
tion is higher than some threshold values. When dual-channel distribution is optimal, 
the seller always prefers to set a higher price and offer a higher level of service in 
comparison to those in the single-channel distribution. In addition, we consider other 
scenarios related to the service provision and the seller’s pricing power. We have shown 
that there is significant value associated with the provision of service. The benefits 
include reducing the dependence on innovative consumers, tolerating a larger C2C 
258     fENg, guO, aND ChIaNg
Ta
bl
e 
3.
 O
pt
im
al
 C
ha
nn
el
 S
tra
te
gi
es
 W
he
n 
B2
C 
Ch
an
ne
l P
ric
e 
Is
 C
om
pa
ra
tiv
el
y 
D
et
er
m
in
ed
 
O
pt
im
al
 d
ec
isi
on
s 
Ch
an
ne
l p
ro
fit
s
Si
ng
le
 c
ha
nn
el
 
s 1
 
=
 
pf
 
p
a
p
pf
2
2
2
− (
)+
(
)
D
ua
l c
ha
nn
el
 
R
f
a
pf
p
d
s
f
f
p
=
−
− (
)
− (
)
+ (
)+
−
(
)
(
)
=
−
− (
)
−
(
)+
1
2
1
1
2
1
3
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
−− (
)
−
−
(
)
(
)
    
θ
θ
a
a
d
 
2
2
2
2
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
p
f
a
d
a
p
d
a
p
pd
f
a
p
a
−
(
)+
−
(
)
+
−
(
)
+
−
(
)−
− (
)+
−
(
)
22
1
2
2
−
− (
)
(
)
f
θ
OPTIMal DIgITal CONTENT DISTrIBuTION STraTEgY     259
channel redistribution cost, and allowing for additional pricing flexibility. We also 
found that, when the B2C channel price is competitively determined in the market, 
the threshold value for choosing an optimal dual-channel strategy decreases in the 
B2C channel price.
The major contribution of this paper is to provide the first step toward understanding 
the digital product seller’s (or the digital content owner’s) dual-channel distribution 
strategy in an emerging technology–enabled C2C market. however, there are several 
limitations. first, we adopted a monopoly model framework in this study. We looked 
at the digital content distribution problem from the perspective of content owner 
(copyright holder) or a forward integrated online retailer (the content owner has its 
own distribution channel). from the legal perspective, the monopoly framework can 
be justified by the fact that digital content is often copyrighted work and is not easily 
substitutable. The monopoly framework also comes from the recent observation that 
musicians, for example, are experimenting heavily on the self-distribution model via 
the Web using revolutionary digital distribution methods such as BitTorrent and other 
file-sharing technologies [20]. Our model provides important managerial insights for 
the design and integration of such new distributional channels. at the same time, we 
also observe that some digital content (e.g., popular files) are available in competing 
(and potentially free) networks. Conceptually, we can distinguish between content 
providers who create and supply original content, and network service providers 
who maintain the distribution network that delivers content. Introducing competition 
between different networks would be an interesting future research topic.
To model consumers’ consumption preferences and purchasing behavior, we as-
sumed the proportion of innovators is a constant that is exogenously determined by 
Figure 6. Optimal Channel Strategy When B2C Channel Price Is Competitively Determined
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the characteristics of the population. One direct benefit of such modeling efforts is 
the analytical tractability and the clean insights gained in forming an optimal channel 
strategy. alternative models, however, could consider it as an endogenous variable 
that is affected by the seller’s price and service choices. how such interaction affects 
the channel strategy and profitability and, more importantly, how channel structure 
might affect the consumer’s consumption experience are important issues that should 
be further investigated.
Our model focuses on a scenario where a single version of the digital product is 
offered. The product has homogeneous quality regardless of the distribution channel. 
realistically, the product may be offered with different compression methods (e.g., a 
codec wrapped with DrM), which results in files of different sizes that are appropriate 
for different needs for downloading, transfer, and playing on different devices. higher 
compression generally comes at the expense of product quality. although continuous 
technological improvement holds the promise of allowing greater compression with 
minimum data loss, understanding the economic implications of product quality on 
product versioning remains another future research direction.
finally, static models cannot reveal insights on market dynamics. In a rapidly chang-
ing business environment, prices often change dynamically over time in response to 
evolving market conditions. future work may also consider dynamic pricing over the 
entire product planning horizon.
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notes
1. The huge potential of consumer-oriented dual-channel distribution is the broader reach 
enabled by the notably low cost of redistribution among consumers. Thus, we implicitly as-
sume that d is substantially lower than the highest possible valuation a. If the redistribution 
cost is too high, no one would redistribute the product, making analysis of the dual-channel 
distribution moot.
2. The authors thank an anonymous reviewer who provided insightful comments.
3. for notational convenience, we use subscripts and superscripts to distinguish various 
scenarios. Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate single and dual channels, respectively. Superscript s 
indicates channel strategies with service provision.
4. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention.
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appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) The seller’s profit difference in the single- and dual-channel strategies in the SD-
Partial market can be expressed as
 
Π Π2 1
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2
2 4 2
s s
d f a d a df d a df
f
− =
− −( ) −( ) + −( ) + −( )
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− −
θ
θ( ) −( )2 2f
.
Because f ≤ 1 and 
 
f a d
a
≤
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
,
we have 4 – q – 2f 2 > 0 and 2 – f 2 > 0. So the denominator is positive.
We see that the nominator is a linear function of q. It is easy to check that the nomi-
nator is negative if q = 0 and is positive if q = 1. There must exist a threshold value 
0 < q1 < 1 such that P2s – P1s = 0. Solving for q1, we have 
 
θ1
2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
=
−( ) −( )
−( ) + −( )
d f a d
a df d a df
.
If 0 < q ≤ q1, then P2s – P1s < 0. So the single-channel strategy outperforms the 
dual-channel strategy. If q1 < q ≤ 1, then P2s – P1s > 0. So the dual-channel strategy 
outperforms the single-channel strategy. 
(b) The seller’s profit difference in the single- and dual-channel strategies in the D-full 
market can be expressed as
 
Π Π2 1
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 1 2 2 2
4 2
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a a f d f a d f
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under conditions f ≤ 1 and 
 
f a d
a
>
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
,
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we have 2 – f 2 > 0. So the denominator is positive. We also have q > 2d/(a + d).
It is easy to check that, if q = 2d/(a + d), the nominator is negative, and if q = 1, the 
nominator becomes positive. Since P2s – P1s is a linear function of q, there must exist 
a threshold value 0 < q2 < 1 such that P2s – P1s = 0. Solving for q2, we have 
 
θ2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2
=
−( ) −( ) +( )
+( ) −( )
a f d af a
a d f
.
If (2d/(a + d)) < q ≤ q2, then P2s – P1s < 0. So the single-channel strategy outperforms 
the dual-channel strategy. If q2 < q ≤ 1, then P2s – P1s > 0. So the dual-channel strategy 
outperforms the single-channel strategy. 
(c) The seller’s profit difference in the single- and dual-channel strategies in the S-full 
market can be expressed as
 
Π Π2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 1 2 2
2 4 2
s s
a f ad d ad a f d f
f
− =
−( ) − +

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+ + −( )
− −( )
θ
θ
.
under the condition f > 1 and 
 
f a d
a
≤
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
,
we have 4 – q – 2f 2 > 0. So the denominator is positive. We also have q < 2d/
(a + d).
We see that the nominator is a linear increasing function of q. It is easy to check 
that the nominator is negative if q = 2d/(a + d). Therefore, P2s – P1s < 0. So it is always 
optimal to adopt the single-channel strategy.
(d) The seller’s profit difference in the single- and dual-channel strategies in the SD-
full market can be expressed as
 
Π Π2 1
24
4
s s ad a d− =
− + +( )θ
.
Clearly, P2s – P1s is a strictly increasing function of q. If q = 0, P2s < P1s, and if q = 1, 
P2s ≥ P1s. Solving P2s – P1s = 0, we have q3 = 4ad/(a + d)2.
Therefore, if 0 < q ≤ q3, the single-channel strategy is optimal. If q3 < q ≤ 1, the 
dual-channel strategy is optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 2(a)
(i) In the SD-Partial market, the difference between the single-channel price and that 
in the dual-channel B2C market price can be expressed as
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from Proposition 1, we know that the denominator is positive. under the condi-
tion f ≤ 1, the nominator is positive if q = 0 and q = 1. Since the nominator is a linear 
function of q, we have p2s > p1s for all 0 < q ≤ 1.
(ii) In the SD-Partial market, the difference between the single-channel price and 
royalty fee in the dual channel can be expressed as
 
R p
d f af a df df
f f
s s− =
−( ) + − − +( )
−( ) − −( )1
2 2 4 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 4 2
θ
θ
.
under the condition f ≤ 1, we have 4 – q – 2f 2 > 0 and 2 – f 2 > 0. The denominator 
is positive. It is easy to verify that the nominator is negative if q = 0. If q = 1, the 
nominator is a function of f 2. The two roots are
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Therefore, we only need to consider f12. There are two cases. 
If 0 < f 2 < f12, then the nominator is negative. In this case, we have Rs < p1s for all 
0 < q ≤ 1.
If f12 < f 2 < 1, then the nominator is positive. In this case, the threshold value for 
Rs > p1
s
 is determined by 
 
′ =
−( )
− − +
θ
2 2
2
2
2 4 2
d f
af a df df .
for all q > q′, Rs > p1s. however, from the boundary condition 
 
f a d
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,
we must have 
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2 2a d af
a d
.
under the condition f12 < f 2 < 1, we can verify that q′ > q″. Thus, we can safely exclude 
the case Rs > p1s. Therefore, in the SD-Partial market, the C2C channel royalty fee Rs 
is lower than the single-channel retail price p1s.
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The analyses in the D-full and SD-full markets are similar. We omit the proofs 
here.
Proof of Proposition 2(b)
In the SD-Partial market, the service difference between the single channel and dual 
channel can be expressed 
 
s s
f d f a d df
f f2 1
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
4 2 2
− =
− −( ) + + −( )( )
− −( ) −( )
θ
θ
.
under the condition f < 1, we have 4 – q – 2f 2 > 0 and 2 – f 2 > 0. The denominator 
is positive. It is easy to check that the nominator is negative if q = 0 and is positive if 
q = 1.  Solving s2 – s1 = 0, we have 
 
θs
d f
a d df=
−( )
+ −
2 2
2
2
2 .
Therefore, s2 > s1 if qs < q ≤ 1, and s2 ≤ s1 if 0 < q ≤ qs.
recall from Proposition 1 that the condition for the dual channel to be optimal is 
q > q1. Write the threshold difference as
 
θ θ1
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
− =
− +( ) + −( ) −( )
−( ) + −( )


s
d a d df a d df f
a df d a df a d df+ −( )2 2
.
It is easy to check that a – 2d + df 2 > 0, a + d – df 2 > 0, 2 – f 2 > 0, a + 2d – df 2 > 0, 
and (a – df 2 )2 + 2d(2a – df 2) > 0. Therefore q1 > qs. We can safely exclude the case 
for s2 ≤ s1. hence, s2 > s1 always holds in the SD-Partial market.
following a similar approach, the same results can be derived in the D-full market 
and SD-full market. We omit the proof here.
Proof of Proposition 3
Write the optimal profit difference in the single channel and the dual channel without 
service provision as
 
Π Π2 1
4 2 4
4 4
− =
−( ) + +( )
−( )
d d a a a dθ
θ
.
It is clear that the denominator is positive. Since the nominator is negative if q = 0 
and is positive if q = 1, solving P2 – P1 = 0, we have 
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θ4
4 2
4
=
−( )
+( )
d a d
a a d
.
Therefore, if 0 < q ≤ q4, then P2 ≤ P1. So the single-channel strategy is optimal. If 
q4 < q ≤ 1, then P2 > P1. So the dual-channel strategy is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4
from the optimal pricing strategies without service provision, we have
 
p p
a a d
2 1
1 2
2 4
− =
−( ) + −( )
−( )
θ
θ
and
 
R p a d− = − +
−( )1
4
2 4
θ
θ
.
Obviously, R – p1 < 0. By the assumption p2 > R + d, we have the inequality a – (3 – 
q)d > 0, which implies a < 2d. Therefore, we have p2 – p1 > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5
In the case of dual channel without service provision, substituting p2 and R into the 
condition p2 – R – d > 0, we have d < a/(3 – q). There are two cases. 
In the D-full and SD-full markets under the dual-channel structure with service 
provision, substituting optimal prices into the condition p2s – Rs – d > 0, taking into 
account the condition 
 
f a d
a
<
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
,
we have ds < 3/((3 – q) – f 2). Notice that d < a/(3 – q) and the denominator (3 – q) – 
f 2 < (3 – q), we have
 
a a
f3 3 2−( ) < −( ) −θ θ
.
In the D-full market, we have d s < af 2. It is easy to show that (a/(3 – q)) < af 2. 
Overall, we have d
_
 ≡ max(d) < d
_
s
 ≡ max(d s).
Proof of Proposition 6
The price difference in the absence of service provision is 
 
p R a d2 4
− =
+
−θ
.
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according to Table 1, there are two cases for the optimal pricing strategies with 
service provision.
If 
 
f a d
a
≤
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
,
then 
 
p R
a d df
f
s s
2
2
24 2
− =
+ −
− −θ
.
Calculating the price differences gives
 
p R p R
f a d d
f
s s
2 2
2
2
2 2
4 2 4
0−( ) − −( ) = − +( )
− −( ) −( )
>
θ
θ θ
.
If 
 
f a d
a
>
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
,
then 
 
p R a ds s2 2
− =
+
.
Since 0 < q ≤ 1, 4 – q > 2. Therefore, we have p2s – Rs > p2 – R.
Proof of Proposition 7
under optimal pricing, the channel profit difference in the single channel with service 
provision and the dual channel without service provision can be expressed as
 
Π Π2 1
2 2 2
2
2 2 2 4 2
2 4 2
− =
− −( ) + −( )( ) + + −( )
−( ) −( )
s
a d f d a d a a d df
f
θ
θ
.
We see that the denominator is positive. If q = 0, the nominator is negative. If q = 1, 
there are two cases. 
If 
 
f a d
a ad d
>
−( )
− +( )
2
2
2
2 2
,
then the nominator is negative. We have P2 < P1s for all 0 < q ≤ 1.
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If 
 
f a d
a ad d
<
−( )
− +( )
2
2
2
2 2
,
then the nominator is positive. Solving P2 – P1s = 0, we have
 
θ5
2 2
2
2 2 2
4 2
=
−( ) + −( )( )
+ −( )
d a d a d f
a a d df
.
If q5 < q ≤ 1, then P2 > P1s. If 0 < q ≤ q5, then P2 ≤ P1s. 
Proof of Proposition 8
following Proposition 1, we can easily verify that, under the condition f 2 ≤ 1, we 
have 
 
∂
∂
=
− −( ) − −( )


− + + −(
θ1
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 4 2 2
2 2 2
2 4 2f
d a d a d f
a adf d f da d f )
< 0
and 
 
∂
∂
=
− −( ) −( )
+( ) −( )
<
θ2
2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 1 3
2
0f
a f f
a d f
.
Thus, the channel indifference threshold values decreases in f 2.
We also see that q1 = q2 if 
 
f a d
a
=
−( ) +( )2
2
θ
,
and 
 
θ θ2 3 2
4
= =
+( )
ad
a d
if f 2 = 1. Therefore, q3 < q2 < q1. Now write the difference between the channel indif-
ference threshold values as
 
θ θ4 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 4 2
4 2 2
− =
−( ) − +( )
+( ) −( ) + −( )
df a d a d d f
a a d a df d a df 
.
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It is easy to check that (2a – d) > 0, (a2 – 4d 2 + 2d 2f 2) > 0, (a + 4d) > 0, and (a – df 2)2 + 
2d(2a – df 2) > 0. Therefore, q4 > q1. 
further comparing q5 with q4, we have 
 
θ θ5 4
2 2
2
2
4 4 2
− =
+( )
+( ) + −( )
f a d
a d a d df
.
The condition 
 
f a d
a ad d
<
−( )
− +( )
2
2
2
2 2
implies that (a + 4d – 2df 2) > 0. Therefore, q5 > q4.
Proof of Proposition 9
To ease the proof, we assume 0 < f < √
_
2. Other cases can be analyzed in a similar 
way without affecting any analytical insights derived under this condition. We focus 
on this because we have normalized the price effect on demand to 1 (see Equation 
(2)). Now we assume the responsiveness of service to demand falls in a comparable 
range (0, √
_
2). 
In order for dual channel to be feasible, we need the following inequality to hold:
 
R
f
a pf p d p ds =
− −( )
−( ) +( ) + −( )( ) ≤ −1
2 1
1
2 2
2
θ
θ θ θ .
Solving this inequality for p, we have 
 
p
a df d
f
≥
−( ) − −( )( ) +
−( ) −( ) +
1 1
1 1 1
2
2
θ θ
θ
.
Denote qp as the threshold value when equality holds in the above expression. 
Write 
 
∂
∂
=
− + − +( ) − −( )
+ −( ) −( ) 
p a df df
fp
p p p
p
θ
θ θ θ
θ
2 2 4 2
2 2
2 4 1
1 1 1
.
It is easy to check that, when 0 < f < √
_
2, the nominator is a decreasing function of qp 
on the interval (0, 1]. Therefore, 
 
− + − +( ) − −( ) < − + − = − − −( )


a df df a df df d a
d
fp p p2 2 4
2 2 4 2 22 4 1 2 1 1θ θ θ

< 0.
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hence, we have (∂p/∂qp) < 0. Then, given p, the dual channel is feasible when 
q ≥ qp.
Substituting the boundary condition R = p – d into the general dual channel profit 
function (7) we have P2s = p(a – p + fs) – d(1 – q)(a – p + fs) – s2/2 . Note that any profit 
P2s achievable by pair (p, s) is strictly less than the single channel profit P1s defined in 
Equation (6) for all q < 1. Therefore, when q = qp, P1s > P2s.
When p is competitively determined, write the profit difference between the single 
channel and dual channel as
 
Π Π2 1
2 2
2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2
1
2 2 1
4 4 4 2 2
2
s s
f
p a d p f p f pa ad paf
− =
− −( )( )
+ + + − − − +
−
θ
p f p a p f pa
pd ad paf pdf
p f
2 4 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 4
4 2 6 6
2 2 4 2
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
θ
− − + +
− + − −
+ 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2+ + − − + +













p a pa p f paf pdfθ θ θ θ θ θ
.
Solving P2s – P1s = 0 we get two roots:
 
r
B
A1
=
− ∆
 
r
B
A2
=
+ ∆
,
where
 
A a p a p pf f p d pf= −( ) − +( ) + +( )2 22 2 2
 
B a p pf a pf d p a p p df= − +( ) +( ) + −( ) + +( )3 22 2 2
 
∆ = −( ) + +( ) − − +( )4 2 2 2 5 22 2 2 2 2 2dp a p f dp p a d p d p f .
Note that the nominator (terms in the last parentheses) in the expression P2s – P1s 
is a quadratic function of q. It is easy to check that the coefficient for q2 is positive. 
under the assumption that 0 < f < √
_
2, the denominator is positive. Therefore, P2s < P1s 
for r1 < q < r2. So, we must have r1 < qp < r2. 
accordingly, the threshold value for adopting dual-channel strategy is determined 
by the large root r2, that is,
 
�θ =
+B
A
∆
.
If q > q}, dual-channel strategy is optimal. If qp < q < q}, dual-channel strategy is feasible 
but single-channel strategy is optimal. If q < qp, dual-channel strategy is infeasible so 
single-channel strategy is optimal. This completes our proof.
